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BOOK REV]IEW:
When Race is Not Enough. A Review of Judy ScAes-Trent's
Notes of a W~hite 1Black W~oman-. Race, (Co~os, Coirnmunkiy
By Sheila Lloyd*
In writing of her liminality as a black woman who "looks white," Judy Scales-Trent in
Notes of a White Black Woman: Race, Color, Community' refers to her recurrent phantom
pain--presumedly arising from her "missing" color or from her destabilized racial identity.2 This
trope suggests that race and color serve as limbs that give us support and a foundation on which
to stand. Quite clearly, race is a foundational concept and, like all foundations, is considered to
be a permanent and transcendent fact of social life. However, Scales-Trent's book effectively
introduces the suggestion that when it comes to organizing ourselves into races--especially
through metaphors of visibility--we don't have a leg to stand on.
Notes of a White Black Woman recalls, for me, W. E. B. DuBois's Dusk of Dawn: An
Essay Toward an Autobiography of a Race Concept.' The comparison readily comes to mind
because both Scales-Trent and DuBois use the histories of their lives as devices for analyzing
what "race" means in the United States DuBois explains, many times in his "autobiography," the
operative logic of his text:
I have named and tried to make this book an autobiography of race rather than
merely a personal reminiscence, with the idea that peculiar racial situation [sic] and
problems could best be explained in the life history of one who has lived them. My
living gains its importance from the problems and not the problems from me.'
For DuBois, the social and the personal are imbricated in one another, and both are historically
variable.
Judy Scales-Trent makes similar claims in the introduction to her work:
Because I am a black American who is often mistaken for white, my very existence
demonstrates that there is slippage between the seemingly discrete categories
"black" and "white." This slippage is important and can be helpful to us, for it
makes the enterprise of categorizing by race a more visible--hence, a more
conscious--task .... It is at this point of slippage that we can clearly see that
"race" is not a biological fact but a social construct--and a clumsy one, at that.
Stories about my life as a white black American also show that creating and
maintaining a racial identity takes a lot of effort on my part, and on the part of
I JUDY SCALES-TRENT, NoTs OF A WHITE BLACK WOMAN: RACE, COLOR, COMMNITY (1995).
2 Id. at2l.
3 W.E.B. DuBois, DUSK OF DAWN: AN ESSAY TOWARD AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A RACE CONCEPT (Transaction
Publishers 1991) (1940).
4 Id. at 221.
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other Americans. "Race" is not something that just exists. It is a continuing act of
imagination. It is a very demanding verb.'
DuBois would most likely agree with Scales-Trent's assertion that "race" is not a "fact," but rather
an "act." DuBois and Scales-Trent also share the opinion that race is not a simple thing of color,
or of biology. In spite of their agreement on these issues and the coincidences of their using life
stories to illustrate the problems of race, they part ways when it comes to explaining what race
becomes when it is no longer conceived of as a matter of color (biology) and when it functions as
a "demanding verb" or discursive construct.
The divergence between the two writers might be explained by the 55 years that separate
their writing and by the varied degrees of their attentiveness to the historicity of race. DuBois,
looking back in 1940 at the concept of race, traces the historical changes and material
consequences of (scientific and cultural) conceptions of race from the end of the nineteenth
century to the first half of the twentieth century. Scales-Trent, by and large, provides her readers
with memoirs and recollections that, in my estimation, conceal the political and historical stakes of
her three key concepts--race, color, and community.
Notes of a White Black Woman is reluctant to elucidate questions about race as an act. If
race is "a very demanding verb," then what mood (indicative, imperative, or subjunctive) does it
operate in, and does it typically appear as an intransitive or transitive verb or as both depending
on historical and social situations? Answers to this question flesh out both how it is that "race"
and racial identities are conferred upon individuals and how it is that individuals are agents
interpreting, rather than blindly assuming, racial designations and identities. Perhaps this is what
Scales-Trent has in mind when she states that race is "a continuing act of imagination,"
Yet there is very little in the book that truly reveals how this is so- In the chapter entitled
"Lessons," Scales-Trent presents the following scenario:
Place: An elegant reception in New York City
Time: Some time in the fifties
The white man was astonished, perplexed.
He stared at the tall, distinguished-looking man standing next to him. A
man clearly of some substance. A man with white skin, straight hair, aquiline nose,
"But how can you tell that you're a Negro?" he asked innocently, stupidly.
And my father answered:
"Because America tells me so."6
America and our families (either obediently or disobediently, depending on the extent of a family's
own self-fashioning of racial identities) tell us what we are racially. We, indeed, become
racialized subjects by becoming subjected to definite, although not transhistorically fixed,
conditions of existence.
In this scenario, the "white" man stares at a reflection of himself, at someone "like" him. If
the "gaze" is the privileged figure of cognition in the Western philosophical tradition, then in this
scenario, the "ocular regime of truth" gives very little comfort to the person who wants skin color
to be an unmediated and transparent sign of race. Rather than suggesting that the "truth" of racial
identity can be perceived visually, this scenario complicates such a commonly held belief and
requires that its readers consider the juridical and social institutions that, as in the case of
Scales-Trent's father, make "white" black.
5 SCALES-TR-NT, supra note 1, at 2-3.
6 Id. at39.
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Absent from this scenario, however, is any indication of what Scales-Trent's father thinks
of his ascription as black and how he, in the 1950s, interprets the racial meanings and sentiments
circulating in the nation. This is not to suggest that the father can act voluntaristically with
respect to race; his agency to interpret racial meanings is created through situations and statuses
conferred on him. In a dialogue, staged in Dusk of Dawn, with an imaginary white male
interlocutor, DuBois arrives at the same conclusion as the father in Scales-Trent's scenario: "I
recognize it [blackness] quite easily and with full legal sanction; the black man [sic] is a person
who must ride 'Jim Crow' in Georgia."7 Although DuBois's and Scales-Trent's dialogues conclude
in a similar fashion, DuBois in moving toward his final claim provides his reader with a sense of
the political and symbolic "work" that race performed in the 1940s, and he develops a
counter-discourse of race that challenges the hegemonic "Jim Crow" discourse of race. For
DuBois, the social meanings of race are transformed by collective political struggle, and this is
how he would interpret Scales-Trent's claim that race is "a continuing act of imagination."
In the chapter in which she tells her life story as a racial subject through her hair,
Scales-Trent begins to suggest how racial identities are productions--which are never complete,
always in process, and always constituted within, not outside, representation. As Scales-Trent
puts it, hers is the story of initially trying to control the "wildness" that is her hair by straightening
it so that: "Finally I had straight hair to match my light skin. Finally I looked beautiful. Finally, I
really looked white."8 The chapter, "Africa in My Hair", goes on to chart the range of hairstyles
that Scales-Trent, in step with different political styles, adopted over the course of her life. Near
the end of this chapter, she laments:
[A]s I get older, my hair gets thinner and straighter .... I am losing the mark of
my African heritage. For although I wear Europe on my face, I wear Africa in my
hair.
White people, as usual, never understand. When they look at my hair, they
see Italy or the Middle East. But when black people see my hair, they know.
They see Africa. And those who don't "know" at least wonder.9
Here, Scales-Trent raises issues that Kobena Mercer addresses in Black Hair/Style
Politics.'0 In his essay, Mercer teases through the symbolic dimensions of hair, which like skin
color, serves as a visible sign of racialized and aesthetic/moral difference However, Mercer
powerfully and compellingly demystifies claims, such as Scales-Trent's that Africa is in her hair, by
analyzing the relation of (hair)style and fashion to the "political, economic and social
circumstances of black people."" But with all of Scales-Trent's strengths in examining race as a
signifying system with political implications, her book ultimately recuperates semiotic and political
codes of race that it otherwise problematizes. (I leave aside, for the sake of space, the ways in
which the issue of gender as a modality of race is implicitly staged in the "Africa in My Hair"
chapter and in others.) By appealing to a discourse of Africanity, Scales-Trent begs more
questions than she answers. Looking through a book such as Sylvia Arden Boone's Radiance
from the Waters: Ideals of Feminine Beauty in Mende Art,' 2 requires that we interrogate the idea
of all African hair as kinky and "wild," to use Scales-Trent's unfelicitous term for her hair.
7 DuBois, supra note 3, at 153.
8 SCALES-TRENT, supra note 1, at 51-52,
9 Id. at53.
10 Kobena Mercer, Black Hair/Style Politics, in WELCOME TO THE JUNGLE: NEW POSITIONS IN BLACK CULTURAL
STUDIES 97 (1994).
11 Id. at 99.
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Given her insistence in "Commonalities: On Being Black and White, Different, and
Same," the first chapter of her work, that she exists at the intersection of race and color,
Scales-Trent does not pause to consider why she later privileges her hair's "old African ways"
instead of addressing the fact of her hybridity in "Africa in My Hair.""s Hybridity is the term
which I would use to describe the liberatory universalism that Scales-Trent deploys in
"Commonalities." In that chapter, Scales-Trent eschews both a relativism that would, for
instance, insist upon the rigid division of people into races and an absolute universalism that
would install one racial position--typically the dominant one--as the center for inflexibly judging
others. Instead of these two dead ends, Scales-Trent argues for each of our human differences at
the same time that she calls for us to recognize our commonalities.
This movement towards a complex apprehension of self-otherness seems very laudable,
and it is not until her readers come across a series of comparisons of Scales-Trent's position as a
"white black woman" to that of others--such as Native Americans who have left the reservation,
and lesbians and gays confronting the possibility of "coming out"--that this goal seems to raise
certain problems. Does she, in fact, ignore the historical specificity of these other positions?
Does a later claim in the work that "we are all African Americans" necessarily follow from the
proposition that "all the people in this country started out on their journey to America from
Africa"? 4 Once again, does Scales-Trent effectively evade history and the specific relations of
rule that have shaped and against which the people who label themselves African-American,
and/or who "come out" as lesbian and gay, struggle?
This becomes a large and very difficult issue that calls for careful consideration, for in
"Sameness and Difference in a Law School Classroom: Working at the Crossroads," the
appendix to Notes of a White Black Woman, Scales-Trent takes on the very concrete concern of
teaching and learning to think through differences. Her conclusions are that:
The only helpful way to teach about difference is to teach about sameness at the
same time. Only if our students are able to see others as they see themselves, able
to care about the issues of others as they care about their own issues, will they
then be able to answer in a generous way "Why does it matter? Why should I
care?" Only if we teach sameness at the same time will they see themselves
implicated in the answer. They must learn that they stand--indeed, are
standing--on both shores of the river at the same time. 5
Scales-Trent works through the ethical dimensions of "Otherness," yet to the extent that her
formulation of this issue remains underspecified in its notions of"sameness" and "self," its political
implications are at best vague."6
What sort of evaluation is involved for our students in their "positing connections,
perceiving similarities and differences, and organizing complex bodies of information into
provisionally intelligible wholes"? 7 Isn't the fundamental matter, after all, one of our being on the
same ground and not on different shores of the river, and does not the question of how our
differences are intertwined and hierarchically organized need theorizing?
12 SYLVIA ARDYN BOONE, RADIANCE FROM THE WATERS: IDEALS OF FEMININE BEAUTY IN MENDE ART (1986).
13 SCALES-TRENT, supra note 1, at 53.
14 Id. at 140.
15 Id. at 180.
16 S.P. Mohanty, Us and Them: On the Philosophical Bases of Political Criticism, 2.2 YALE JOURNAL OF
CRITICISM 1, 23 (1989).
7 Id. at 24.
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This leads me to consider how Scales-Trent attempts to link together her three key terms:
race, color, and community. One way in which I think she brings these terms together is to call
for a place that she can consider home; this can, in some respect, be seen as the recurring motif of
Notes of a White Black Woman. For Scales-Trent, race does not equal color does not equal
community, and to make it so is indeed to indulge in wishful thinking. But in certain respects, the
text contradicts itself on these issues.
In some of the entries from her journal as reprinted in Notes of a White Black Woman,
Scales-Trent writes:
Cast out, cast out, always cast out from the only home, the only safe place, the
only refuge in a terrifying, vicious land ....
No place to belong.
No place to rest a frightened and lonely heart.
No place to hide ....
That's who I am. Cast out of my house ....
Yes, I can see that. What I'm missing is the protection of the family.
But I lost something more when I grew up and moved out of the
segregated South, out of the safety of my childhood home, because the Jim Crow
laws gave me an identity and a protection I couldn't give myself.8
The poignancy of the fear of loss that accompanies change seems quite real for Scales-Trent.
However, the rhetoric of home can slight the relationship between personal/group history and
political priorities. "Home," in spite of Scales-Trent's personal claims to the contrary, is not
always a center of affirmation and protection. Feminists have been making this claim for quite
some time to pass this over without comment now.
Equally confounding is the idea that the Jim Crow laws conferred identity and protection
to Scales-Trent. The first of these suggestions is quite apparent, but the second is frankly
baffling. This confusion can only be explained away if Scales-Trent were to tell us how her family
attempted to protect its children from the stifling effect of Jim Crow laws in the segregated South.
In this way, we would come to understand how protection came from her family in reaction to the
laws. Yet, she does not offer this explanation, and instead relates how her world turned
topsy-turvy upon her family's migration to New York City: "Suddenly, the world was open to
me: streets, movies, schools, restaurants. I put one foot into the world of white-Jewish-liberal-
intellectuals when I was in the fifth grade, and I've been straddling two worlds ever since."' 9 Why
need this be seen as a deficit? The act of "straddling two worlds" only becomes a drawback if a
discourse of authenticity plays a role in Scales-Trent's recollections. My view is that, unwittingly,
it does to the degree that Scales-Trent finds herself rejected by one world (a black one) because of
her color and rejects the other (a white one) because of her race:"
In trying to move and think beyond these naturalized orderings of the world, Scales-Trent
forges a signifying chain in which the familial, the racial and the communal are bound together.
Family, in this chain, functions as a transcendent signifier, explaining certain aspects of
Scales-Trent's racial identity and providing her with a model of community. Her view almost
seems to be: that if her family--which ranges in color from "white" to "brown"--can coexist, then
why can't other individuals?
18 ScALEs-TRENr, supra note 1, at 13-14.
19 Id. at 14.
20 Id.
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In the final chapter, this view becomes clearer as Scales-Trent details a visit to one of her
former students, a member of the Iroquois Cayuga Tribe, Turtle Clan. She states of this
experience:
[Ilt was a gift of extraordinary dimension, for they [the Campbell family] opened
up to me their life as a family, as a people, as friends and neighbors, as members of
a religious community . . . . And there was also something about that day that
made me think about how we do not know one another. We do not know our
neighbors; we do not know the students in our classes; we do not know the people
we see every day."'
If individuals can move outside of the naturalized groupings of families and races to welcome and
come to know strangers, then the color line, and other divisions that we allow to separate us, can
be dismantled. As Scales-Trent writes in her introduction, "this dream--that we can all live
together as brothers and sisters--is one that sometimes comes true, if only for a few moments, an
hour, a day."2 Although it is a bit fashionable these days to regard a view such as Scales-Trent's
as an instance of sentimental liberalism, Scales-Trent attempts to share with her readers one of
many ways in which "the dream of racial purity" can be replaced by "a dream of community."23
But before we hastily prepare ourselves to realize this dream, we do need to question
whether the models of family and home adequately serve the purpose of our coming to understand
each other better. We also need to consider the reasons for our needing to know each other. In
many respects, the creation of new forms of community depends upon work, knowledge and
struggle. Community, in my view, has to be constantly reevaluated in relation to critical political
priorities in order for this new shaping of community not to become another essentialist
connection. A notion such as A. Sivanandan's "communities of resistance," in which "[c]ommon
problems and common interests le[a]d to a common culture of resistance--and to community," is
something that I think needs to be united with Scales-Trent's ideas.24 Bringing this perspective
together with Scales-Trent's allows us to avoid two traps, the purely experiential/essentialist and
the common theoretical oversight of the materiality of personal and collective histories.
In conclusion, although I have focused in these pages on certain specifics in Scales-Trent's
book that seem to require further scrutiny and theorization, what must be emphasized is that it is
arguably the purpose, and inarguably the achievement, of her "notes" to invite the careful and
caring attention of a larger community of discourse.
gI *SeilanLoyd i:s :an -Assistant Professor: of Fnlsha
State, University of New York at Biiffiol.1
21 Id at 149-50.
22 Id. at 9.
23 Id.
24 A. SIVANANDAN, COMMUNITIES OF RESISTANCE. WRITINGS ON BLACK STRUGGLES FOR SociALIsM 78 (1990).
